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1. The Financial Times
reported that Ruth Nagle,
lead portfolio manager for
the financial sector on
BlackRock’s Global Opportu-
nities funds, said that the
move towards a single regu-
lator under the ECB “would
help standardise financial
reporting and enable
investors [to] compare
banks across the euro-
zone.”‘US Funds Place Big
Bets on Euro Bank Recov-
ery,’ Financial Times, 19
November 2013.
2. See especially Scharpf
(1970, 1999).
AMERICAN INVESTORSare rediscovering European
banks. One reason is that markets seem to con-
sider that the European Central Bank's upcoming
asset quality review (AQR) will enable them to
have greater faith in claims about the health of the
banking sector because one regulator will have
checked the books in a systematic fashion. More-
over, there will be more uniform standards for
banks reporting of their accounts, and this should
facilitate comparability across borders1.
But under Europe's future banking union’s Single
Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), headed by the
ECB, will the level of transparency of the banking
sector really approach the level taken for granted
in the United States? A key player in providing this
transparency in the United States is an inter-
agency body, the Federal Financial Institutions
Examination Council (FFIEC). It provides through
a central repository timely, consistent and pub-
licly accessible quarterly supervisory filing data
on all American banks that receive Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation coverage – roughly 8,200
banks. Moreover, with minor exceptions, it makes
this data public in consistent formats and it pro-
vides updated data from banks on its website gen-
erally within a week of receiving it. This data is far
from perfect. Concerns in the United States that
this data was not detailed enough during the
global financial crisis led to the creation of a new
Office of Financial Research (OFR) in the 2010
Dodd-Frank Act. The Office’s mandate is to improve
the data collection process (Flood et al, 2012).
Nevertheless, it is useful to compare the avail-
ability of data in Europe to the FFIEC benchmark.
In this Policy Contribution, we explain why it is
important for democratic accountability and
market efficiency that regulators provide publicly
accessible, timely and consistent data, and we
address common concerns about privacy. We
review the US framework and we benchmark the
current state of supervisory information from
SUPERVISORY TRANSPARENCY IN THE BANKING UNION Gandrud and Hallerberg
European Union member states against the US
system (see Table 1 on the next page for a sum-
mary comparison). We have contacted relevant
supervisors in all EU member states in an attempt
to access individual bank data. It is perhaps not
surprising that none approach the level of regula-
tory filing transparency one finds in the United
States – in fact, only five euro-area member states
release any individual bank level data that is
easily accessible (Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Portu-
gal and Spain). Perhaps more surprising, however,
is that not only do other regulators not make the
data available, but several member states also
treat the data as confidential.
Finally, we examine recent EU-level efforts to
increase bank transparency. Many of these
changes are still being decided, but the measures
that have been implemented do not approach the
minimal standards of consistency, timeliness and
publicly accessibility found in the US. At minimum,
we urge the ECB to make individual supervisory
filing data for the banks that it directly regulates
under the Single Supervisory Mechanism publicly
available in a timely and consistent manner. It
would also be helpful if there would be more infor-
mation exchange between member states.
WHY MAKE INDIVIDUAL BANK REGULATORY DATA
AVAILABLE?
There are two major benefits from increasing bank
regulatory transparency in the European banking
union. The first is improving democratic account-
ability; the second is market efficiency. 
On accountability, the literature generally holds
that a process can be legitimate at two stages of
the policy process, namely through inputs and
outputs2. For 'input legitimacy', the issue is
whether the people directly decide on the super-
visor. If one focuses on bank supervision, it is
unrealistic to expect much input legitimacy – it is03
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In Germany, the Bundestag Finance Committee
holds hearings that involve the regulators (namely
the Federal Financial Supervisory Authority, or
'BaFin', and the Bundesbank). Given German pri-
vacy laws, the regulator is not allowed to divulge
specific details about bank balance sheets even
in confidence before the committee. This means
that members of parliament do not have access to
any more balance sheet information than mem-
bers of the public. However, based on the passage
of a recent law that implements Basel III in German
legislation, this is about to change so that as of
2014 information is provided to parliamentary
investigative committees on a need-to-know
basis4. Rather than ‘police patrols’, such power
amounts to ‘police investigations’, that is, there is
an ability to check, but not to conduct regular over-
sight, of the books of specific banks.
There will be a similar arrangement to the Bun-
destag in the European Parliament. Based on an
extremely rare for countries to have the people
elect regulators or supervisors directly3.
For regulators in general and the SSM in particular,
the focus of ensuring legitimacy is therefore on
‘output legitimacy’. Do supervisors take actions
that are in the best interests of the people they are
supposed to serve? Or do they make decisions
that, for example, favour the financial industry at
the expense of the taxpayer? 
There are two ways to monitor supervisors: ‘police
patrols’ and ‘fire alarms’ (McCubbins and
Schwartz, 1984). The former involves regular over-
sight, most commonly through a legislative com-
mittee that holds regular hearings in which the
supervisor is expected to brief the legislators and
answer their questions. In the US, regulators such
as the Chairman of the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve Bank testify before Congressional
committees. The hearings are generally public.
Table 1: Availability of individual bank supervisory ﬁling data in the US and EU*
United States EBA ECB EU member states
Bank coverage All banks insured by the
FDIC and bank holding
companies.
64 banks from the Euro-
pean Economic Area
included in the recapitali-
sation exercise.
None currently. 11 member states, five of
which are in the euro area,
make some data readily
available.
Timeliness Quarterly data release
within 1 day to one week.
Easily accessible as a
bulk download from 2001
for banks and 1986 for
bank holding companies.
Less than annually data
(December 2012 and
June 2013). June 2013
released December
2013.
N/A Varies (see Table 2).
Consistency Largely consistent quan-
tities across banks and
time. Where there are
inconsistencies these
are well documented.
Consistent over the two
time points and across
banks.
N/A Considerable variation
across countries and time.
Level of Detail Almost complete regulatory
filings, including detailed
data on bank’s balance
sheets including asset’s
broken down by type, non-
performing loans, and for-
eign exposure.
Detailed capital, compo-
sition, exposures to sov-
ereigns, credit risk,
market risk and securiti-
sation, as well as Loan To
Value across portfolios.
N/A Varies, though always less
than US.
URL Banks:
https://cdr.ffiec.gov/publi
c/PWS/DownloadBulk-
Data.aspx
Bank holding companies:
http://www.chicagofed.or
g/webpages/banking/fin
ancial_institution_reports/
bhc_data.cfm
http://www.eba.europa.eu/
risk-analysis-and-data/eu-
wide-transparency-exer-
cise
N/A See Table 2
Source: Bruegel. Note: * as of December 2013.
3. The only example we
know of is the election of
Insurance Commissioners
in many American states.
Besley and Coate (2003), in
a widely cited study, find
that elected Insurance Com-
missioners are more pro-
consumer than appointed
Commissioners. We know of
no examples of directly
elected bank supervisors.
4. See Deutscher Bundestag,
Beschlussempfehlung des
Finanzausschusses, Druck-
sache 17/13524,
15/5/2013, p. 29; available at
http://dipbt.bundestag.de/dip
21/btd/17/135/1713524.pdf.5. Available at:
http://www.europarl.europa.
eu/document/activities/cont
/201311/20131107ATT740
64/20131107ATT74064EN.
pdf. Accessed December
2013.
6. Accessed 10 December
2013 at
http://www.europarl.europa.
eu/news/en/news-
room/content/20130912IP
R19704/html/Declarationof-
the-President-of-the-EP-
and-of-the-President-of-the-
ECB.
7. The more and higher qual-
ity data companies make
available, the better under-
standing analysts have of
the companies. This
improves their predictions
about banks’ profits and
losses thus improving
investor decisions (Roul-
stone, 2003; Yu, 2010). The
dataset’s format affects
information efficiency. Liu et
al(2013) find that making
data available in the stan-
dard eXtensible Business
Reporting Language (XBRL)
increased the number of
analysts following a given
company and improved
their forecast accuracy.
8. This assumes that credi-
tors and depositors are not
fully insured.
9. See Blum (2002),
Cordella and Yeyati (1998),
Baumann and Nier (2003).
form this function if individual bank filing data is
secret. To make a judgement about regulators’
decisions, the public needs to be able to observe
not only supervisory actions, but also the context
in which they were made. And if supervisors know
the public will have the same data, they might be
more likely to act in the public interest in the first
place.
For a fire alarm to work it needs to go off when the
fire is occurring, not a long time afterwards. Anal-
ogously, supervisory data needs to be released in
a timely manner, covering a fairly recent time
period – such as the previous quarter – and
should be released shortly after the data is sub-
mitted, perhaps with a slight delay for accuracy
checks. This is especially important for bank
supervisory data – one tool that the public might
want to evaluate is the use of forbearance. If there
is a significant delay in the release of data (say
one year), then supervisors could effectively put
a bank in forbearance without the public knowing
this action had been taken.
It is in the context of ‘fire alarms’ that the supervi-
sory transparency we investigate here contributes
to increased democratic legitimacy. It allows the
public and interest groups to evaluate the behav-
iour of supervisors. 
The second reason why regulator transparency is
desirable is that it increases market efficiency by
improving the quality of information available to
investors7. When investors have better informa-
tion, banks make better decisions. If investors and
depositors can observe banks’ decisions then
they will ‘punish’ banks for risky decisions through
higher borrowing costs8. Banks therefore have an
incentive to decrease their risk profile when there
is greater transparency. However, if the market
cannot observe bank risk taking, banks will make
higher risk moves9.
A common argument against regulatory trans-
parency is that it is bad for financial stability. If
investors learn that a bank is in trouble, there may
be a run on it, and this could hurt the whole
system. This would be especially troublesome for
banks that suffer from exogenous shocks and that
had not previously engaged in overly risky behav-
iour (Cordella and Yeyati, 1998). However, Nier
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inter-institutional agreement between the Euro-
pean Parliament and the ECB5, under the SSM, the
ECB will be required to attend twice-yearly hear-
ings of a committee of the European Parliament.
More specific hearings are confidential, as is
potentially much of the information the ECB will
give the European Parliament regarding specific
companies and individuals. Moreover, the ECB has
pledged to cooperate with the European Parlia-
ment when it carries out an investigation. Whether
MEPs will have similar access to German Bun-
destag members to the detail of the balance
sheets of specific banks is unclear, but it would
appear that – like in Germany – this would be an
agenda item only when there is an ‘investigation’6.
These ‘police patrols’ are certainly useful, but one
should consider to whom they report and where
they patrol. The information in both the German
and European cases is often presented in a confi-
dential forum, and only the members of the
respective parliaments have a chance to partici-
pate. This means that European parliamentarians
will have the chance to review what the ECB is
doing, while the German parliamentarians can
investigate the German supervisor. If current plans
for the supervisory division of labour move for-
ward, the ECB will supervise the 130 or so largest
banks while the national supervisors will be
responsible for the remainder. Taken together, the
‘police patrols’ will generally occur in isolation. This
is fine if one thinks that supervisors will be equally
tough in all member states. There may be concern,
however, that national supervisors will choose for-
bearance with national firms; one country’s super-
visor may give its banks more time. There will be
no opportunity for, say, parliamentarians from
other member states to evaluate or question
another country’s supervisor. This is a fundamen-
tal problem of the ‘police patrol’ method of provid-
ing output legitimacy in a European banking
union.
‘Fire alarms’ are another device to address output
legitimacy. The idea here is that the public
receives regular information about a given topic,
and the public will set off an alarm if there really
is a problem. This type of oversight works only if
there is transparency – it must be possible for
non-policymakers to evaluate what the supervi-
sor is doing. Non-governmental actors cannot per-Gandrud and Hallerberg  SUPERVISORY TRANSPARENCY IN THE BANKING UNION
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10. Granja (2012) also
finds evidence from the
United States that banks
subject to more stringent
public disclosure
requirements can generally
be wound down at lower
cost to the public. One
reason for this is that more
information increases
participation in asset
auctions, and makes it
more likely that potential
buyers that value the
assets highly will attend.
BOX 1: WEIGHING PRIVACY CONCERNS
We have approached the topic of making bank regulatory filing data available from the point of view
of the public’s interest in democratic legitimacy and effectiveness. Another way to approach the
topic, however, is from the point of view of protecting private sector banking institutions’ privacy,
especially information that may reveal their private business models. In stark contrast to US regu-
lators, a significant proportion of European supervisors do not release individual bank filing data
because they treat this information as confidential and often regard it as commercially sensitive. 
If banks did not create significant negative externalities, it would indeed be reasonable to not pub-
licly release data on their activities. However, the line between private sector banks and the public
sector is very blurred. As the recent financial crisis has reminded us, banks’ liabilities are effectively
contingent liabilities for the public. Private sector (and publicly owned) banks can create very sig-
nificant negative externalities (De Nicolò et al, 2012) that can end up causing major public costs
and severe disruption of economic sectors (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009). Given the significant neg-
ative consequences of inadequate regulation to prevent bank failures, it is important for the public
to be able to hold regulators accountable. This is difficult without an understanding of how decisions
are made, ie access to the regulatory filing data on which they are based. Furthermore, as we have
noted, more bank transparency reduces the probability of banks facing trouble. The public’s inter-
est in accountable financial regulation and market efficiency outweighs individual bank’s privacy
concerns.
One could, of course, consider something in between whereby information is released after a quar-
ter, instead of immediately it becomes available. Knowing that this information is coming, a bank
would have some time to make adjustments if there is a real surprise in the data that the supervi-
sor will publish. To avoid unevaluated forbearance, however, the release should not be delayed any
further than one quarter.
(2005) found that more transparent banks – that
is, those that reported data in their published
accounts – were less likely to experience a crisis.
This suggests that the net effect of transparency
on stability is positive10.
There is an efficiency reason relevant especially
for Europe given the introduction of tougher rules
that require a significant bail-in of junior asset
holders if a decision is taken to resolve a bank.
Knowing this, why would investors willingly
become junior asset holders in the first place?
They will want transparent information on the
health of each bank. If that information is not forth-
coming, they will demand a premium. This, in turn,
will make capital more expensive in Europe.
Why should individual bank supervisory filing
data be made available?
One response to the arguments we have advanced
is that data for banks is already available. Banks
file reports with markets, often as a requirement
of being publicly traded. European banks also file
reports under the Capital Requirements Directive
(CRD) IV Pillar 3. Why insist that regulators make
timely and consistent financial supervisory filing
data centrally available, rather than rely on banks
to release information on their own websites? 
There are a number of reasons why a supervisor
releasing filings data is preferable to voluntary
releases (we will address Pillar 3 reports below).
They include:
￿ Reporting requirements for publicly traded
companies do not apply to private non-publicly
traded banks, which may nonetheless con-
tribute to financial instability. 
￿ The type of data required for publicly traded
companies might not give an accurate view of
activities crucial to understanding a bank’s
health. This is one of the key reasons that finan-
cial regulators require banks to make additional
filings to them. 
One could also argue that banks self-report on
their web pages. Data made available by banks ion11. See Flood et al(2012)
for a detailed overview of all
microprudential supervi-
sory data collected and
made available in the
United States.
12. See:
https://cdr.ffiec.gov/public/PWS
/DownloadBulkData.aspx.
Accessed November 2013.
13. See: http://www.federal-
reserve.gov/apps/report-
forms/reportdetail.aspx?sO
oYJ+5BzDal8cbqnRxZRg==.
Accessed December 2013.
14. A few items in the report
are automatically treated as
confidential and confiden-
tiality can be requested to
protect a significant com-
petitive position or personal
privacy.
15. See:
https://www.ffiec.gov/nicpu
bweb/content/help/helpFi-
nancialReport.htm.
Accessed December 2013.
16. See:
http://www.chicagofed.org/we
bpages/banking/financial_inst
itution_reports/bhc_data.cfm.
Accessed December 2013.
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their websites, however, is less useful than official
filing data made available on a central public site
because:
￿ Data made available by banks individually may
be less consistent and comparable than data
provided to a financial regulator. Regulators will
at least be more likely to be able to conduct
minimal accuracy checks. 
￿ Data released by a supervisor for all of a juris-
diction’s banks in one place can be more easily
collated for comparative analysis. 
￿ The public will likely be especially interested in
banks that fail. When a bank fails its website
might be closed. Previously accessible data
may then become inaccessible at precisely a
time when the public is most interested in it.
And a bank that is about to disappear may not
provide the same detail about its accounts as
a healthy bank.
￿ For output legitimacy, it is preferable to judge
regulators actions relative to the information
they have, which may differ from other sources. 
Another important question is why is consolidated
data – ie data for the entire banking sector of a
given jurisdiction – not sufficient to enable
accountability? To be able to hold supervisors
accountable for their decisions, one needs to have
data at the individual bank level. Individual bank
data is also needed to improve market efficiency
because it allows investors to distinguish between
banks within a jurisdiction. See Box 1 for a dis-
cussion of the privacy concerns that arise from
releasing individual bank filing data, and why they
are insufficient to justify not releasing the data.
CURRENT PRACTICE IN THE UNITED STATES
The United States has adopted a highly transpar-
ent system of individual bank regulatory filing
data dissemination. All banks that receive FDIC
insurance are required to make Call Reports on the
last day of each calendar quarter. Information
includes earnings, balance sheet, asset quality,
liquidity and capital (Flood et al, 2012)11. These
‘To be able to hold supervisors accountable for their decisions, one needs to have data at the
individual bank level. Individual bank data is also needed to improve market efficiency because
it allows investors to distinguish between banks within a jurisdiction.’
are generally available the day after the regulator
receives them, and they are freely available for
download from the Federal Financial Institutions
Examination Council’s website12. Data is available
for download in a variety of file formats that can
be opened by a variety of software programmes.
Quarterly data is available from 2001 to the pres-
ent. The data is consistent and can be merged and
interrogated in a range of ways. For example,
banks’ assets are broken down by class, includ-
ing mortgages, agricultural loans and so on. This
allows one to examine banks’ exposure to specific
sectors. Importantly, there is relatively detailed
data on non-performing loans, a key indicator of
bank health. Quantities are typically presented in
three ways: domestic, foreign and consolidated
between the two, allowing researchers to examine
how exposed banks are to difficulties in foreign
financial markets.
In addition to bank’s Call Reports, the US Federal
Reserve also requires larger and more diverse
bank holding companies to submit so-called FR Y-
9C reports every quarter. The reports are coordi-
nated with the Call Reports and contain income
and balance sheet information, and supporting
schedules on quantities such as off-balance sheet
items. The Federal Reserve uses them as “a pri-
mary analytical tool [for monitoring] financial
institutions between on-site inspections”13. The FR
Y-9C reports are generally public14, and can be
accessed electronically either on an individual
bank holding company basis from the FFIEC15 or
as a bulk download from the Federal Reserve Bank
of Chicago’s website16in a variety of formats. Usu-
ally the data is available within 24 hours of its sub-
mission or revision.
Data in these reports is designed to work with data
sets created by other government agencies. This
further enables relatively easy analysis of the US
banking system. Being able to easily combine
bank supervisory filings with decisions to provide
banks with public assistance in the event of fail-
ure makes the process of evaluating public insti-
tutions’ resolution decisions relatively07
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straightforward. Though Levine (2012) argues
that the United States needs a further independ-
ent and non-regulatory institution to gather and
evaluate information on a wider range of bank
activities, the existing data has been, and could
be further, used in fairly extensive analyses con-
ducted by academics, private investors and the
media.
CURRENT PRACTICE IN THE EUROPEAN UNION
To examine how timely, consistent and publicly
available individual bank regulatory filing data is
in the EU compared with the US, we first conducted
a survey of national regulators based on a list cre-
ated by the European Banking Authority (EBA)17.
Table 2 on the next page summarises the results.
We asked each agency18if it or any other agency
in the country makes supervisory filing data avail-
able. We then examined the data and noted its
basic characteristics. Of the 28 EU countries, the
data is available electronically in 11. This includes
Bulgaria, Denmark, Finland and Spain. Of the
remaining 17, nine consider this data confidential
and do not make it available. In some cases, such
as in the United Kingdom and Germany, confiden-
tiality has a legal basis. In others, such as Austria,
confidentiality is based on the supervisor’s pro-
fessional obligations. Eight countries neither
described the data as confidential to us nor made
it available electronically19(see Table 2).
Of the 18 euro-area countries as of January 2014,
only five (Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Portugal, and
Spain) currently have any accessible data. 
Moreover, among the countries that make some
data available, both the frequency and quality of
reporting varies.  For example, data is available
monthly for Spanish commercial banks, but only
annually in Finland. The time span of the coverage
also varies. The Czech Republic makes data avail-
able back to the year 2000, while Latvia has only
released data from the third quarter of 2012. Dif-
ferent countries' data is not reported in a consis-
tent file or language format.
Spain, through the Spanish Bankers Association20
and Spanish Savings Bank Association21, makes
the most complete data set available. Monthly
filing data is available from 2002 for savings
banks and on a quarterly basis from 2004 for com-
mercial banks, in standard formats. 
Given current rules, it is up to national regulators to
make any of this data available. If regulators or
national governments felt it is in their interest to
stop publishing the data, there is no European-
level requirement to continue.
From this survey of minimal data availability prac-
tices, we have found that the majority of European
countries do not make individual bank data elec-
tronically available to the public. Even among
countries that do make data available, there are a
variety of practices concerning the timeliness and
consistency of the data. It is therefore difficult for
the public to be able to hold their supervisors
accountable. Though the data made publicly avail-
able through national regulators will likely be only
a subset of data given to the ECB for its supervi-
sory activities under the newly created Single
Supervisory Mechanism, it will nonetheless be dif-
ficult for the public to hold the ECB accountable for
its activities because it will be very unclear what
minimal information they had about individual
banks and when.
Finally, it is important to emphasise that this
survey was of minimal data sharing practices. We
did not catalogue the range of quantities being
recorded – eg breakdowns of assets by class and
non-performing loans – in the individual bank
filing data. Most countries that reported data
reported fairly simple balance sheet data. Even in
Spain, which has some of the most complete
reporting, non-performing loans – a crucial indi-
cator for determining a bank’s health – are not
included in any detail. No member state reports
data at the level of detail one finds in the US.
Reporting by the European Banking Authority
and future plans
A number of initiatives are already in place to
improve bank transparency. However, these ini-
tiatives have significant deficiencies in terms of
making data publicly available in timely and con-
sistent formats.
To promote greater “market discipline and finan-
cial stability,” in 2012 and 2013 the EBA con-
17. See:
http://www.eba.europa.eu/ris
k-analysis-and-data/credit-
institutions-register.
Accessed November 2013.
18. We emailed each
agency at least twice. If we
did not receive a response,
we followed up with tele-
phone calls.
19. In these cases we
received written or verbal
confirmation from the rele-
vant agency that the infor-
mation is not regularly
electronically available to
the public. In some of these
countries, such as Sweden,
data can be accessed on a
case-by-case basis by con-
tacting the supervisor
directly.
20. Asociación Española de
Banca.
21. Sector Cajas.08
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Table 2: EU bank supervisors, data publication practices (as of December 2013)
Country Agency Availability Period of
electronic
availability
Frequency Format
Austria Finanzmarktaufsicht Confidential
Belgium Nationale Bank van België/Banque
Nationale de Belgique
Confidential
Bulgaria Bulgarian National Bank Available Since 2004 Quarterly Excel sheets by
company-quarter
Croatia Croatian National Bank Available Since 2001 Quarterly Excel sheets by quarter.
Also PDF.
Cyprus Central Bank of Cyprus Unavailable
Czech Rep. Czech National Bank Available Since 1999 Quarterly Excel and PDF by quarter.
Denmark Finanstilsynet Available 2000-12 Yearly Excel sheet by company-year
Estonia Finantsinspektsioon Available 1999-07 Yearly Web form
Finland Finanssivalvonta  Available 2002-12 Yearly Web page (downloadable as CSV)
France Autorité de contrôle prudentiel Unavailable
Germany Bundesbank, Bundesanstalt für
Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht
Confidential
Greece Bank of Greece Confidential
Hungary The Central Bank of Hungary Available 2005-12 Yearly Excel sheets by filing category
Ireland Central Bank of Ireland Confidential
Italy Banca d´Italia Unavailable
Latvia Finanšu un kapitla tirgus komisija Available Since Q3 2012 Quarterly Excel sheet by quarter
Lithuania Bank of Lithuania Available Since Q4 2012 Quarterly Excel sheet by quarter
Luxembourg Commission de Surveillance du
Secteur Financier
Confidential
Malta Malta Financial Services Authority Confidential
Netherlands De Nederlandsche Bank Unavailable
Poland Polish Financial Supervision Authority Unavailable
Portugal Banco de Portugal Available 2006-present Quarterly PDF versions of bank
filings in Portugese
Romania National Bank of Romania Confidential
Slovakia Národná banka Slovenska Unavailable
Slovenia Banka Slovenije Unavailable
Spain* Banco de España Available S: since 2002; 
C: since 2004
S: quarterly;
Cl: monthly
Savings banks: PDF and XBRL i;
commercial banks: PDF, Excel
and XBRL
Sweden Finansinspektionen Unavailable
United Kingdom Financial Conduct Authority, Bank of
England
Confidential
Source: Bruegel, survey of responsible regulatory institutions. See: http://bit.ly/1efQSjN for more information. Where data is
listed as ‘Unavailable’, the responsible authority told us that the data was not regularly released, but did not indicate that this
was for confidentiality reasons. Note: * S = savings banks; C = commercial banks.
Web addresses of authorities making information available:
Bulgaria: http://www.bnb.bg/BankSupervision/BSCreditInstitution/BSCIFinansReports/BSCIFRForeignBanks/BS_Q_201306_EN;
Croatia: http://www.hnb.hr/supervizija/eindex.html
Czech Republic: http://www.cnb.cz/en/supervision_financial_market/information_published_issuers/
Denmark: http://www.finanstilsynet.dk/da/Tal-og-fakta/Statistik-noegletal-analyser/Statistik-om-
sektoren/Tidsserier/2012/Pengeinstitutternes-regnskaber-2000-2012.aspx
Estonia: http://www.fi.ee/index.php?id=1174
Finland: http://www.finanssivalvonta.fi/en/Statistics/keyfinancialfigures/Pages/Keyfinancialfigures.aspx
Hungary: http://felugyelet.mnb.hu/en/left_menu/pszafen_publication/golden_books.html
Latvia: http://www.fktk.lv/en/statistics/credit_institutions/bank_public_quarterly_reports/2013-03-21_public_quarterly_reports/
Lithuania: http://www.lb.lt/stat_pub/statbrowser.aspx?group=8070&lang=en
Portugal: http://www.bportugal.pt/pt-PT/Supervisao/Paginas/Contasdasinstituicoes.aspx
Spain: savings: http://www.cajasdeahorros.es/#/PAG|estados; commercial: http://www.aebanca.es/en/EstadosFi-
nancieros/index.htm09
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ducted “transparency exercises”for the 64 banks
that were part of the 2012 recapitalisation exer-
cise. These provided fairly detailed data about
banks, including their capital, risk weighted assets
and sovereign exposure22. The data is download-
able in a variety of formats. This was certainly a
good step towards making bank filing data pub-
licly available. However, it had a number of limita-
tions. The data was collected only for an
important, but very small subset of European
banks. Many key banks are not included, such as
all of the banks in Spain that received public assis-
tance to strengthen their capital during the recent
financial crisis23. The data is not particularly
timely. For example, the results of the 2013 exer-
cise were published in December 2013, but only
cover the first half of 2013. Because the EBA does
not independently gather data, but relies on
member state supervisors, the International Mon-
etary Fund has raised concerns about the EBA’s
ability to verify effectively the accuracy of this
type of data (International Monetary Fund, 2013).
Finally, because the recapitalisation exercise is a
one-off24 it is not clear how permanent these
transparency measures will be.
The European Union's Capital Requirements Direc-
tive (CRD IV) does mandate regular publication of
bank information25. CRD IV implements Basel Pillar
3 and requires that banks publicly disclose infor-
mation about their capital adequacy and risk
exposure. The EBA will issue in 2014 further guide-
lines on how banks should make these disclo-
sures. Though this is a very positive step at
making important individual bank data publicly
accessible, it has a number of drawbacks. As of
2013, banks have leeway to choose what infor-
mation to report, what format to report it in and at
what frequency. 
Banks often use different strategies to mitigate
risks. Therefore arguably one of the strengths of
the rather loose requirements for what data banks
report is that the requirement allows each bank to
create a qualitative and quantitative report that
reflects its risk positions given its particular activ-
‘The EBA will issue further guidelines on how banks should make disclosures about their capital
adequacy and risk exposure. Though this is a very positive step, it has a number of drawbacks.
Banks have leeway to choose what to report, what format to report it in and at what frequency.’
ities. Nonetheless, this makes it difficult to com-
pare banks’ activities and to evaluate the regula-
tors26. Second, because banks are given
considerable discretion to choose the format in
which to present their disclosures, it is costly to
even gather data that would be comparable. Third,
institutions are allowed to choose their reporting
frequency, as long as they report at least once a
year. Annual reports are much less timely reflec-
tions of an institution’s health than quarterly or
monthly reports.
We argue that the EBA should at the minimum con-
sider more specific guidelines for the format and
timeliness of Pillar 3 reports. A requirement could
be included for a ‘quarterly quantitative appendix’
where information typically presented in Pillar 3
report tables is presented using a standardised
XBRL taxonomy, ie a set of standardised defini-
tions for each part of the regulatory filing27. 
In addition to establishing guidelines for Pillar 3
reports, the EBA and its predecessor the Commit-
tee of European Banking Supervisors (CEBS), have
gathered and released member state-level data
required by the 2006 Capital Requirements Direc-
tive28since 200729. Importantly, this data is only
at the aggregate level; one cannot generally trace
the health of any individual bank, which means
that it is a less effective way to evaluate what the
supervisor is doing. The type of data reported
includes the number of credit institutions in each
member state, overall asset and capital levels, key
measures of credit, operational, and market risk,
and national supervisory actions, such as the
number of on-site inspections. This could poten-
tially be used as a way of developing a basic
understanding of regulators’ actions in the
absence of bank-level data. However, even though
the data is only reported in aggregate, it is up to
member state regulators to determine if the data is
confidential and therefore not reportable. 
Figure 1 shows the number of EU countries that
reported any information to the EBA regarding gen-
eral banking system characteristics, credit risk30
22. See the EBA press
release at: http://andrewgel-
man.com/2013/12/17/repli
cation-backlash/. Accessed
December 2013.
23. ‘European Banking
Authority releases “trans-
parency exercise” of Major
EEA Banks Ahead of ECB
Asset Quality Review’, Euro
Intelligence News Briefing,
18 December 2013.
24. See the EBA description at:
http://www.eba.europa.eu/ris
k-analysis-and-data/eu-capi-
tal-exercise.Accessed
December 2013.
25. For the full text, see:
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/Lex-
UriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:
L:2013:176:0001:01:EN:HTML.
Accessed November 2013.
26. The EBA itself has been
critical of the lack of infor-
mation that banks provide
in Pillar 3 reports. In its
2012 assessment of 19
banks’ reports the EBA said
that, like the year before,
“no institution has fully
complied with all of the
requirements assessed”
(EBA, 2013). Apart from
monitoring the reports and
establishing best practices,
the EBA is unable to sanc-
tion banks that do not
follow its guidelines.
27. See for example:
http://www.eurofiling.info/fin-
repTaxonomy/taxonomy.shtml.
Accessed November 2013.
28. Available at: http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/Lex-
UriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2006:17
7:0001:01:EN:HTML.
Accessed December 2013.
29. See:
http://www.eba.europa.eu/sup
ervisory-convergence/super-
visory-disclosure/aggregate-
statistical-data.Accessed
November 2013.
30. Market and operational
risk is also gathered, but
whether or not a country
reports these is highly cor-
related with whether or not
it reports credit risk.10
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and supervisory activities – even if the data was
recorded as ‘non-applicable’, ‘non-material’ or
‘confidential’. At the height of the financial crisis,
most countries did report something to the EBA.
Particularly, in 2009, all EU member states except
Denmark reported basic data on their national
banking sectors – eg how many banks they have
and their basic asset structure – and credit risk.
Only Denmark and Greece did not also report
supervisory measures for this year. However, in
2012, six countries did not report national banking
sector data, and 11 did not report credit risk data31.
Though aggregate data is certainly important to
have during a banking crisis, the relative lack of
reporting outside of crisis periods makes evaluat-
ing supervisors’ outputs difficult. To hold a regula-
tor accountable for their actions, the public needs
to be able to evaluate how they responded to con-
ditions before they developed into a full crisis.
Beyond reporting national aggregate data, shortly
after its creation in 2011, the EBA surveyed 57
banks from 20 EU countries for data on what they
identified as ‘Key Risks Indicators’. This data is not
publicly available. It was only made available to
the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) – a part
of the ECB charged with macro-prudential over-
sight – on an aggregate country-level basis. These
indicators have been described as “very basic
indicators, with limited breakdowns” (Enria,
2012). The ECB and ESRB supplemented this
coarse data with ad-hoc data collected for a
subset of EU banks’ ‘bottom-up’ stress tests. This
data was primarily used by the ECB and ESRB to
perform ‘top-down’ stress tests. The data was
made available to the ECB/ESRB under “strict con-
fidentiality agreements”(Enria, 2012).This clearly
limits the public’s ability to evaluate the ECB and
ESRB’s actions and hold them accountable.
There are recent moves at European level – par-
ticularly at the European Banking Authority – to
standardise individual bank regulatory filing data
collection and dissemination. The Common
Reporting (COREP) standards for capital adequacy
and the Financial Reporting (FINREP) standards
for financial information aim to, for the first time,
establish standardised requirements for European
banks’ quarterly regulatory reports. Clearly these
programmes should facilitate the gathering of data
that is consistent across the European Union and
can be used for common supervision32. The report-
ing requirements come into effect at the beginning
of 2014. They also stipulate uniform frequencies
and reporting dates. The current standards do not
apply to the reporting of asset encumbrance, non-
performing loans and forbearance. The EBA
expects to develop these standards in 2014.
Clearly having common reporting standards will
improve the ECB supervisors’ ability to monitor
European banks under the SSM. Nonetheless,
though common reporting standards will be
adopted by all EU member states, and the ECB will
develop its own capacity to gather information on
some of the euro area’s major banks, there will
likely be little impact on the public’s ability to
access the data unless the regulator makes it pub-
licly available. To improve its accountability, the
ECB should go a step further and release the indi-
vidual bank supervisory filing data that it collects
in a timely and consistent manner. 
Doing so will be a considerable and important
change from the status quo. Table 3 on the next
page shows the countries included in the SSM.
They are ordered by how banks in their jurisdiction
have been deemed large and important enough to
be part of the ECB’s October 2013 Comprehensive
Assessment33. We can clearly see that member
states with relatively many banks tend to either
make their data unavailable or confidential. Only
23 percent of the institutions included in the
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Figure 1: Number of member states without miss-
ing aggregate banking data reported by the EBA
Source: Bruegel.
31. Note that these are
countries that not only did
not report data, they also
did not even declare the
data to be non-applicable,
non-material, or confiden-
tial. We verified this in an
email exchange with EBA
officials.
32. See:
http://www.eba.europa.eu/r
egulation-and-policy/super-
visory-reporting/imple-
menting-technical-standard
-on-supervisory-reporting-
corep-corep-large-expo-
sures-and-finrep-/-/regulato
ry-activity/press-release.
Accessed November 2013.
33. The full list of banks can
be found at:
http://www.ecb.europa.eu/p
ub/pdf/other/notecompre-
hensiveassess-
ment201310en.pdf.
Accessed December 2013.11
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Table 3: Individual bank data dissemination practic es in SSM countries (as of December 2013)
Country No. of banks in SSM comprehensive
assessment (Oct. 2013)
Indv. bank data
conﬁdential/available
Reported credit risk data
to EBA in 2012
Germany 24 Confidential Yes
Spain 16 Available Yes
Italy 15 Unavailable No
France 13 Unavailable Yes
Netherlands 7 Confidential No
Austria 6 Confidential Yes
Belgium 6 Confidential
Luxembourg 6 Confidential No
Ireland 5 Confidential Yes
Cyprus 4 Unavailable No
Greece 4 Confidential No
Portugal 4 Available No
Estonia 3 Available No
Finland 3 Available Yes
Latvia 3 Available Yes
Slovenia 3 Unavailable Yes
Malta 3* Confidential Yes
Slovakia 3** Unavailable Yes
% of banks in countries with available/reported data 23 60
Source: Bruegel. Notes: * One of Malta’s top three banks is a subsidiary of another institution already part of the SSM in another country. ** All
three of Slovakia’s top three banks are subsidiaries of institutions already part of the SSM in another country.
Comprehensive Assessment (29 of the 124) are
primarily located in countries that make any
individual bank supervisory data available. 60
percent of the banks (75 of the 124) are primarily
located in countries that provided some credit risk
information to the EBA in 2012. 
There will be a major improvement to supervisory
transparency and potential accountability if the
ECB publicly releases individual supervisory filing
data for the banks that it directly supervises under
the SSM.
CONCLUSION 
Making individual bank filing data publicly
available in a timely and consistent manner does
not guarantee that banks will not fail and financial
crises will not happen. Spain, which compared to
its European counterparts has regular, though
minimal, data reporting, nonetheless has been
through a difficult banking crisis. Despite
availability, the data certainly did not prevent
Spain’s banking crisis, nor did it prevent the crisis
in the United States. Perhaps part of the problem is
that the level of detail available even in these two
countries is still inadequate. For example, the
public and regulators continue to lack sufficient
data on shadow banking activities. Furthermore,
just because data is available to the public to be
used to hold regulators accountable does not
mean they will actually do so. This lends support
to Levine’s (2012) argument that bank regulatory
filing data needs to be not only publicly available,
but that there needs to be an independent and
skilful institution that regularly evaluates banking
system health and raises issues that might be of
concern to the public. This argument, in turn, is
justification for the creation of the Office of
Financial Research under the United States’ Dodd-
Frank Act.
In the European case, the EBA could possibly take
on such a role. The EBA already plays this role to
some extent through, for example, its short com-
mentary adjoining the 2013 transparency exer-
cise. Similarly it has a specific responsibility to
raise concerns about financial innovations that
are potentially harmful to consumers, as it
recently did when it issued a warning about the
risks of virtual currencies34. However, its ability to
access data necessary for this role is limited. As
we have shown, it has little ability to independ-
ently gather information from banks or member
states35.
34. See:
http://www.eba.europa.eu/do
cuments/10180/15971/EBA
+Warning+on+Virtual+Curren-
cies.pdf.Accessed Decem-
ber 2013.
35. In a recent assessment,
the International Monetary
Fund found that banks and
Member States were often
not forthcoming with the
EBA’s data requests. The
EBA has also been reluctant
to use its limited powers to
compel the release of
requested data (Interna-
tional Monetary Fund,
2013, 9-10).12
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A number of concrete steps are needed to
increase minimal transparency across the Euro-
pean banking union. Careful consideration should
be given to the determination of common rules
and practices that protect individuals’ privacy
while allowing adequate supervisory accountabil-
ity. These rules will need to be applied at both
European and member-state levels. As a mini-
mum, there should be a requirement for the ECB
and member state supervisors to publish the data
on their own using standardised rules set out by
initiatives such as FINREP and COREP. Ideally,
resources would also be allocated to create a
single European data repository, such as the
United States’ FFIEC. The EBA is a natural home for
such a repository.
One way forward would be for policymakers to
consider European-level legal changes in the form
of an addition to the SSM Regulation requiring the
ECB to release the data it collects via an EBA repos-
itory, and a new directive instructing supervisors
in SSM member states to do the same. Requiring
only the ECB to release the data on the approxi-
mately 130 banks it directly supervises could
place it in conflict with member states that either
for legal reasons or in practice do not release indi-
vidual bank data. National supervisors might, for
example, be reluctant to share information with
the ECB if it uses different transparency stan-
dards. Only requiring the ECB to release the data
would also leave the vast majority of the European
banking system opaque. It would not apply to
most banks in SSM countries, because national
supervisors regulate them directly. A European-
level legal framework to release the data that
applies to both the ECB and member-state super-
visors would solve these two problems.
European Union directives that require member-
state transparency to improve the internal
market’s efficiency have precedents. For example,
though not involving individual company infor-
mation, the Mutual Information and Transparency
Directive requires member states to inform the
European Commission of all draft laws regarding
technical regulations on goods and some services
(see Correia de Brito and Pelkmans, 2012). 
If the EBA is to become the data repository then
European-level legal change is also needed to
enhance its powers. As we have seen, EBA efforts
to increase very minimal, often aggregate-level
transparency through persuasion and other tools
currently at its disposal, have led to inconsistent
results. Member states have found it too easy to
simply not report anything and the EBA has little
ability to determine the veracity of data it does
receive.
Finding agreement on an EU legal change that
requires the ECB and member-state supervisors
to open their books to greater scrutiny will surely
be a difficult task given the current diversity of
practices and interests – eg banks, national
supervisors – that benefit from this diversity. 
But greater supervisory transparency will facili-
tate more efficient distribution of capital and
increase market discipline. It will increase the
legitimacy of actions that the regulator takes
against banks. The European Union receives justi-
fied flak that there is a great distance between
European citizens and the institutions that make
decisions on their behalf. There is real suspicion
of the financial sector and distrust that public
money goes only to help out political friends.
Transparency in terms of the data the supervisors
themselves use to make decisions would allow
the public, and more realistically the various inter-
est groups one finds in civil society, to judge
whether regulators did choose actions consistent
with protecting the public interest. Such 'fire
alarms' therefore represent one small step
towards addressing the democratic deficit that
most citizens think exists in Europe.
If such transparency is not possible, for purposes
of increasing ‘output legitimacy’ more work should
be done to strengthen the role of parliaments. For
the European Parliament, the autumn 2013 inter-
institutional agreement with the European Central
Bank represents a good start. Under all current
proposals, national regulators will continue to play
an important role especially for any bank resolu-
tion. As discussed earlier, the German Bundestag
gains the ability in 2014 to investigate specific
banks as part of the national implementation of
Basel III. Such parliamentary powers should
become standard in all European Union member
states. Moreover, such a procedure should be not
only a theoretical power, but also one that is used.13
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